colonised, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives. 5 The soul is the body without organs seen in its disciplined aspect, but it is not the whole of the body without organs. Foucault's vision of the duplication of the body is an impoverished one in comparison to Deleuze and Guattari's, and he pays the price of this conceptual diminishment by sheering himself of any plausible means of explaining how or why one might adhere to the conventions and demands of the socius itself except through coercion. The full body without organs is the soul animated by desire. Foucault's description of the modern soul is instructive nonetheless because it points up the degree to which the body without organs is a social rather than individual concept: we all have our own body without organs, but it is plugged into a larger entity that is the body without organs of all body without organs, or the plane of consistency. This larger entity that all our individual bodies without organs is plugged into is society's own body without organs and it is my contention that we can only properly understand this particular concept if we apprehend it at this level.
The priority of Marx
As a first measure in standing this concept back onto its feet, then, it has to be recognised that although Antonin Artaud is the source of the phrase 'body without organs' his work plays only a very small part in its theorisation as a concept. This is not to say Artaud is unimportant to Deleuze and Guattari, but the truth is they tend to treat his work as pre-philosophical, as a source of symptoms or ideas rather than concepts. Moreover, focusing on Artaud reinforces the misperception that the body without organs is the exclusive preserve of individuals. Correcting this view requires that we look to the concept's more important conceptual sources: Lacan, Spinoza and Marx. This list is in either ascending or descending order of importance depending on how you look at things: Deleuze and Guattari attribute the invention of the concept to Lacan, but this seems to be of significance only inasmuch as they can use it against Lacanians 6 ; they suggest that the architecture of the concept was foreshadowed by Spinoza, and they take from this finds on the reverse side of the Big O. There "desire is shifted into the order of production, related to its molecular elements, where it lacks nothing, because it is defined as the natural and sensuous objective being, at the same time as the Real is defined as the objective being of desire." 8 Desire, on this understanding, constantly surpasses the neat triangle of mommy-daddy-me imposed by psychoanalysis. On its second or Spinozist approximation, the body without organs is "the immanent substance, in the most Spinozist sense of the word; the partial objects [i.e., Lacan's petit a] are like its ultimate attributes, which belong to it precisely insofar as they are really distinct and cannot on this account exclude or oppose one another." 9 But the significance of this insight can really only be seen when it is rewritten into a Marxian discourse, as Deleuze and Guattari do for us in the opening pages of Anti-Oedipus . If we want to have some idea of the forces exerted by the body without organs, then we must first establish a parallel between desiring-production and social production. To put it another way, we have to establish that desire functions on the same level as the real. However, Deleuze and Guattari then go onto say this parallel is to be treated as strictly heuristic, at least in the first instance.
Its one purpose is to point out the fact that the forms of social production, like those of desiringproduction, involve an unengendered nonproductive attitude, an element of antiproduction coupled with the process, a full body that functions as a socius . This socius may be the body of the earth, that of the tyrant, or capital. This is the body that Marx is referring to when he says that it is not the product of labour, but rather appears as its natural or divine presupposition. 10 This is the body without organs in its social aspect: "It falls back on (il se rabat sur) all production constituting a surface over which the forces and agents of production are distributed, thereby appointing for itself all surplus production and arrogating to itself both the whole and the parts of the process, which now seem to emanate from it as a quasi cause." 11 In A Thousand Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari transform this insight into an analytic principle: the body without organs has two phases: an initial phase of construction and a subsequent phase of making things circulate. 12 Judith Butler has demonstrated that the concept of gender -not the actual the experience of gender -follows precisely this course. What she effectively claims, without using this terminology, is that gender is an incorporeal transformation: the very labels 'man' or 'woman' seize us and transform us. Gender is an attribute -an effect -that penetrates our bodies and functions there as 'quasi cause' of everything we do. We are not born into our gender, we assume it, but once it has taken hold we act in its name. This effect interacts with other effects, such as race and class. As Butler points out, even if one accepted that it was possible to choose one's gender, it is nevertheless impossible to choose not to have any gender at all. You thus desire on gender, it is part of your body without organs. Gender is a rigged game -you can choose to be man, woman, or transgendered, but you cannot choose to be nongendered because the very notion of 'sex' as some neutral biological (i.e., non-cultural) given is simply the other half of the equation.
Gender and sex work together in a manner Deleuze and Guattari describe as biunivocal. Each effect functions as the concrete proof of existence of the otherthis is what it means to say they are quasi causes. We oscillate between the two, jumping from circle of hell to the other. Gender, Deleuze and Guattari argue, is the mechanism power needs to exert itself. Part of the difficulty Butler has in explaining how gender and sex differ from one another (yet operate together) stems from the fact that these terms have the appearance of being, as it were, unengendered or naturally occurring. But, as she effectively wants to argue, but doesn't quite have the vocabulary to do so, these terms are very far from naturally occurring -they are engendered but in such a way that they seem to fall back on themselves and smother their origins from view so as to appear unengendered. This is how the body without organs operates. Its chief operation is to 'fall back on' itself and create a smooth plane for desire. This example points to what is perhaps the key feature of the body without organs: it functions as pure presupposition, that is, the thought or idea which thought cannot grasp. It is like our soul, always there, always in need of work, and always unreachable.
The body without organs is not a 'feedback loop' as Bard and Söderqvist suggest because what occurs on the body without organs is not the same thing, and isn't constructed in the same way as the body without organs itself. 13 What occurs on the body without organs doesn't feed back into it. To continue the example above -if I cross-dress I am maybe playing with my gender, but I'm not thereby altering it, whether on an experiential level or a theoretical level. By the same token, because the body without organs is a virtual entity, Katherine Hayles's complaint that it doesn't pay enough heed to physical constraints is without foundation. 14 More to the point, conceptually the body without organs should be understood as our way of coping with physical constraints. It is our means of fabricating a mental position from which to view the conditions of our everyday life as making sense.
The Internet's body without organs
Presuppositions can sometimes be brought to light by asking: what ought to be? In the first years of the Internet, i.e., the early 1990s, when it was still small enough to be contained on a single mainframe computer, the key permutation of this Web to look at unclothed young women and lose money at poker than for any other purposes." 15 Setting aside its moralising tone, the contrast with TV is instructive because in its early days it was subjected to considerable scrutiny and regulation by government -the kind of scrutiny and regulation it was subjected to varied quite widely from nation to nation. The Australian government, for instance, regarded it as a service and placed it in the same policy category as health and education. Interestingly, TV was thought too important and too dangerous (it grasped immediately the propaganda power of the new medium) to leave in private hands and policy was developed accordingly. The basic tenets of its policy were that it should be free, available to all (the infrastructural cost of this is staggering when you consider the dispersed nature of the population), and informative (all stations were required to provide news services as well as educational programming for children). It did not opt, however, for complete state control as Britain did, but neither did it leave it all to the market as the US did, although even there the government placed severe restrictions on content.
Australia aimed for a kind of middleground that allowed for commercial applications, but kept a close eye on what those applications were. TV was essentially a national technology and the issue of what it could and should be a matter of national debate.
The Internet has never been a national technology in this sense so its development has not been overseen by a governmental body, except in the most ad hoc way via band-aid legislation which, in the case of child pornography say, can do nothing more than ban certain practices and create the judiciary conditions needed to punish the offenders, but cannot actually stop it. And that is how things should be according to the majority of Internet pundits, whether e-business billionaires or left-wing academics: Internet equals freedom. 16 This is the Internet's body without organs: the great and unquestioned presupposition that it is an agent of freedom.
The "material problem confronting schizoanalysis is knowing whether" the body without organs we have are any good or not, or more to the point, knowing whether we have the means of determining whether they are any good or not. 17 The body without organs is an evaluative concept which, as Guattari instructs in his last book Chaosmosis, should be used dialectically, which is to say with a view towards an understanding of how it is produced. 18 In other words we should ask two basic questions: how is a particular body without organs produced? and what circulates on it once it has been produced?
Just how enfeebled a concept of freedom the Internet rhetoric implies was exposed by the press reaction to the story of Google's entry into the Chinese market, which is said to be growing by 20 million users a year and was already tiny by US standards, but it doesn't take a genius to see that the potential for growth is huge and with everyone predicting that China is going to be the next superpower one can understand why Google would want a foothold). To be allowed to set up servers on mainland China and create a Google.cn service, which will be faster and better suited to purpose than the regular US version Chinese people already have access to, Google had to agree to adhere to the Chinese government's regulation and control of Internet content. This means complying with its three Ts rule: Tibet, Taiwan and Tiananmen are all off limits, as are such search categories as human rights, Amnesty International, pornography, and of course Falun Gong. It is believed that there are 30 000 online police monitoring chatrooms, blogs, and news portals, to ensure that these topics aren't discussed and these kinds of sites aren't accessed. Although this isn't the first time Google has agreed to cooperate with government and effectively censor its search results (in Germany it restricts references to sites that deny the Holocaust, while in France it restricts access to sites that incite racial violence), the scale of its compliance with the Chinese government's censorship requirements far exceeds anything it has done before.
That Google chose to make these compromises as the necessary price of doing business in the world's fastest growing economy was read by many as a betrayal of the values of freedom Google is supposedly an emblem of. The fact that these jeremiads were largely confined to the business pages of liberal papers suggests that the notion of freedom they had in mind was largely of the freedom-to-dobusiness kind wrapped up in the rhetoric of freedom of speech. This obviously self-serving acquiescence to censorship is defended by the company on the grounds that "providing no information (or a heavily degraded user experience that amounts to no information) is more inconsistent". 19 What this case demonstrated is that Google isn't really concerned about our access to content at all. All the blustery talk about compromised values was really just a verbal smokescreen trying to cover up this one glaring truth: Google's priority is its access to new markets and it will not hesitate to compromise its putative ethic of 'do no evil' in order to achieve that goal. If we regard Google as a gigantic multinational corporation, which with a net worth in excess of $US80 billion (making it bigger than either Coke, General Motors or McDonald's) it in fact is, then there should be little to surprise us in its about-face in China. It is only if we continue to buy into the fantasy that it and somehow the Internet as a whole is a bastion of freedom that we find these events dismaying. If the Internet was ever a 'commons' to use the word anti-corporate commentators like Naomi Klein have made fashionable, then there can be no doubt that it is rapidly being 'enclosed', the implication being that Amazon, Google and eBay are still only the 'primitive accumulation' stage. Information is in effect a natural resource like oil that Google exploits without regard for the environment (as oil companies do when we aren't Oxford ." Until then, however, the "digital divide" prevents this democratising magic from having its effect. According to Schmidt, thanks to the Internet we don't have to take what business, the media or politicians say "at face value" and this is empowering. Schmidt's view is that what is actually said on-line isn't as important as the 'freedom' to say whatever one happens to want to say. Thus, he says, governments should stop focusing on how to control the Web and "concentrate on how to give Internet access to more people in more countries." Government should, in other words, help Google to expand its market. 21 By the same token, as Google's negative response to requests for assistance in tracking down users of child pornography from US law and enforcement agencies illustrates, Google thinks the government shouldn't be allowed to impinge on its market. Although Yahoo, MSN and AOL have been willing to help out, Google has held fast citing the right to privacy as its rationale. But Google patently speaks with a forked tongue on this subject. Co-founder of Google, Larry Page, defended the company's refusal to help identify child pornographers by saying, rather tellingly, that the company relies on the trust of its users and that giving out data on users would break that trust. His implication is obvious: if Google gave out data on its users it would effectively turn customers away and eventually lose its pre-eminent place as market leader. Protecting market share is how we should understand Page's call for legislation that stops government from being able to ask for such data in the first place. If several million sites were to vanish then that would clearly make a difference, but the loss of a few hundred or even several thousand might not. If sites were dimensions then according to Deleuze and Guattari's definition of the rhizome their removal would alter the whole, so we have to conclude that individual websites are units of the Internet, not dimensions. Empirically we know that the number of websites is important; there is for example a vast difference between the Internet of today, which has hundreds of millions of specific sites, and trillions of pages to go with them, and the Internet of 1990, which had fewer than two hundred sites and could be contained in its totality on a single PC. But this doesn't mean we have to abandon the idea that the Internet is a multiplicity because there is another way we can come at this problem.
Thus we come to the third principle, that the rhizome operates by variation, expansion, conquest, capture and offshoots (not reproduction), which is essentially a matter of population, which in contrast to the numbering number can be grasped in dimensional terms. Darwin 's two great insights were, according to Deleuze and Guattari , that the population is more significant than the type in determining the genetic properties of a species, and that change occurs not through an increase in complexity, such as the proliferation of individual websites or multiplication of weblinks entails, but rather the opposite, through simplification. Internet usage certainly bears this point out as recent trends confirm -the Internet is the standard source of product information, everything from details of the latest designs to replacement user manuals are lodged there; it is also becoming the preferred point of sale as more and more business is conducted on-line; it is steadily taking over from its rivals TV and Radio the role of content provision, as podcasts and downloads become more the rule the exception. In the process the Internet is changing how we understand 'media' -on the one hand, it is steadily displacing the variety of media that used to exist (newspapers, magazines, TV, Radio and Cinema) onto itself; while on the other hand, it is absorbing new interactive functions, such as data searches and direct on-line sales, the other media can't offer. Paradoxically, then, from the perspective of the user the Internet is without doubt the most powerful homogenising and standardising machine invented since money. First of all, all pre-existing media has been compelled to adapt itself to suit the Internet environment; second, having stripped the media of its exclusive preserve to make and distribute news, movies or whatever, the Internet has 'enabled' a whole new kind of media production, from the so-called 'citizen journalists' we hear so much about today, to bloggers, to home-movie makers and amateur pornographers. Viewed from the perspective of the media as a whole (i.e., from a population perspective), the Internet has simplified what media means and in the process set off a massive expansion of media operations into virtually every corner of existence. It is having the same effect on retail.
The fourth principle, that the rhizome pertains to an infinitely modifiable map with multiple entrances and exits that must be produced, is I would hazard the most important. But its implications are neither obvious nor fully explained by Deleuze and Guattari, although it is clear that it has the highest priority in their view. In effect, what it means is this: the rhizome is not manifest in things, but rather a latent potential that has to be realised by experimentation. This can linked to the sixth principle, namely that the rhizome isn't amenable to any structural or generative model because basically what Deleuze and Guattari are saying is that you can't either prescribe the Internet into existence or expect to find it naturally occurring. It has to be invented. The rhizome is the subterranean pathway connecting all our actions, invisibly determining our decision to do this rather than that. Insofar as we remain unaware of its existence and indeed its operation we do not have full control over our lives. The rhizome is in this sense a therapeutic tool. "For both statements and desires, the issue is never to reduce the unconscious or to interpret it or to make it signify according to a tree model. The issue is to produce the unconscious, and with it new statements, different desires: the rhizome is precisely this production of the unconscious." 29 The rhizome of the Internet cannot simply be the pre-existing network of connected computers.
Rather we have to conceive it terms of the set of choices that have been made concerning its use and determine the degree to which the resulting grid is 'open' or 'closed'.
The fifth principle -that the rhizome is acentred, nonsignifying, and acephalousappears to be one that could be left unchallenged. Yet, if we were to grant that the Internet is acentred, nonsignifying, and acephalous in appearance and indeed in its very construction, the reality of its day-to-day use still does not live up to this much-vaunted Deleuzian ideal. Here we have to remind ourselves that Deleuze and Guattari regard the rhizome as a tendency rather than a state of being. will always lead to Amazon or Abebooks or whoever, the minimal conceptual distinction that used to separate Google from the Yellow Pages has basically vanished. 31 The operating premise of Google searches may not be that when whenever we are searching, no matter what we are searching for, we are actually looking for something to buy, but its results certainly appear to obey this code.
Insofar as we rely on Google as our user's guide to Internet, the Internet we actually see and use is thus 'stable, centred, and hierarchical', i.e., the very opposite of rhizomatic. Google searches are conducted on a 'stable' electronic snapshot of the Internet, not the living breathing thing itself, which it indexes very precisely; the search engine is patently a centring system, de facto and de jure, and what could be more hierarchical than PageRank? This is not to say that Google isn't an extremely useful tool, because plainly it is; but it is to insist not only that it has its limitations, some of which are quite serious, but that isn't the only means of searching for information available.
A new problematic?
If we were to follow Deleuze's watchword, that philosophy has the concepts it deserves according to how well it formulates its problems, then we would not start from the idea that the Internet might be a body without organs or looks like a rhizome or indeed any other pre-existing point of view. Instead we would try to see how the Internet works and develop our concepts from there.
In its first flush, the Internet seemed to be about connectedness, but that idea has since been exposed as a perhaps necessary but nonetheless impossible ideal (like the Lacanian conception of sexual relations), that we are at once compelled to try to realise and destined never to succeed in doing. Now, though, Battelle's work has made it is clear that the Internet is much more about searching than connecting. Although connecting people -strangers with strangers, friends with friends -is a major feature of the Internet's cultural role, it is predominantly used to search for objects, i.e., commodities, and in the case of pornography and celebrity gossip one may well say it is searching for people in their guise as commodities. A lot of quite utopian claims have been made on behalf of the Internet, the strongest being that it has so changed the way people interact it has created a new mode of politics. But it now seems clear that it is just another 'model of realisation', Deleuze and Guattari's term for the institutions capitalism relies on to extract surplus value from a given economy. That business couldn't immediately figure out how to make money out of the Internet, i.e., turn it into a 'model of realisation', meant that in the early years of its existence the utopian image of it as an affirmative agent of cultural change was able to flourish, giving the Internet a powerful rhetorical legacy it continues to draw on as it is moulded more and more firmly into a purely commercial enterprise. the Internet -one writes with a pen, makes calls with a phone, and searches the Internet. When our searches don't yield the results we're after we tell ourselves it is because we don't properly understand Google, that we don't have enough practical experience with it, or sufficient competence to use it fully, rather than dismiss the search engine itself as fundamentally flawed. It is in this precise sense that Google has become, in noological terms, the 'image of the search'. 32 Google's significance is clearly more cultural than technical because it determines our view of Internet technology itself, deciding for us -in advance and without discussionwhat it is actually for. If the problem in the early days of the Internet was that noone could foresee the range of its applications and seemed to stand around waiting for history instead of putting in place the appropriate legislation and policy to guide its development some now think of as missing, the problem today is that everyone thinks they know what its application should be -the facilitation of sales -and any sense that it might have a more progressive use has been consigned to the dustbin of fantasy. If there is something the matter with the Internet it is that its utopian beginnings block critical thoughts about its future, as though somehow its starting point was already the fabled end of history when the concrete and abstract become one.
John Battelle says he wrote The Search because it was his sense that Google and its rival search engine companies had somehow figured out how to 'jack into' our "culture's nervous system". 33 His account of the seemingly inexorable rise of the search engine giant, which is largely a standard corporate biography, is by turns alarmist and infatuated, he is in equal measure amazed by Google's power and disturbed by it. It is, however, Battelle's attempt to use Google's history to say something about contemporary culture that makes for the most fascinating reading and whether we agree with his prognosis or not I think we have to take it seriously. There can be no doubt that the Internet is going to play an increasingly significant role in shaping cultural attitudes, behaviours and practices in the future. His decision not to write a book about Google per se but rather something like a Google-effect is undoubtedly wise. As much of a behemoth as Google is, there's no guarantee that it will be around forever. It may disappear, as AOL appears to be doing as its business model founders in the face of Google's, or it may be swallowed up by an even more aggressive predator such as Microsoft Street is worried that Microsoft won't be able to shake off the competition -it has no answer to Apple's iTunes and it is losing the battle to control the Web. 34 It has also lately been reported that Google and Yahoo, as well as Microsoft, are cooking up plans to encroach on eBay's turf, though so far the results are disappointing to investors. But the business sector at least sees it as both inevitable and desirable -commercial users of eBay apparently feel they have maxed out on that service and to reach new customers they need access to new providers. 35 The Internet seems to engender a kind of restlessness in us to always want see what's just over the horizon, one click away. The success of Amazon, Google and eBay (amidst the blaze of spectacular dot.com failures of the past decade) is intimately related to the way their sites facilitate searching. Google's strength in this regard is obvious, but we shouldn't overlook just how good Amazon and eBay are in their own highly localised domains. What these companies have cottoned onto is something we might call 'search engine culture'. The Internet thrives not because it can be searched, but because the search engines we use to navigate it respond to and foster the desire to search by constantly rewarding us with the little satisfactions of the unexpected discovery. A potent search engine makes us feel that the world really is at our fingertips, that we are verily 'becoming-world'. One can find objective evidence of the intensifying influence of 'search engine culture' in the constant consumer demand for increased bandwidth and memory capacity to facilitate it. Most households in the West possess vastly more computing power than they could hope to use, except for such activities as searching the Web. It may be that on-line business is only just now starting to take off and show genuine profits because it has only lately developed an appreciation of the architecture of the desire called 'searching'. As John Lanchester puts it, Google "has a direct line, if not quite to the unconscious dreaming mind of the world, at least to the part of it which voices its wishes." 36 I believe the same is true of Amazon and eBay and indeed a range of other Internet services such as online dating and grocery shopping that are yet to produce corporations of the gigantic proportions as these icons. 37 But I don't accept that Google is the global id, as Lanchester puts it, because to do so is to accept that our deepest atavistic desire is to buy something and there could be no more dystopian outlook than that. Neither 
